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The Residential Tenant's Right to Freedom of
Political Expression
James E. Lobsenz and Timothy M Swanson*
[An] area likely to be litigated concerns speech in pri-
vate residential communities. The exercise of free speech
rights may be especially vulnerable in privately owned or
managed communities such as apartment and condominium
complexes.... In these communities, all the common areas,
including halls, stairs, elevators, paths, streets, parking lots,
and other community facilities, are usually owned by a
private corporation or individual. If left unregulated, the
owner could restrict the rights of the residents to assemble,
speak, demonstrate, or advocate within their own
community.
Justice Robert F. Utter1
I. INTRODUCTION
Three months before the publication of Justice Utter's
comments, Virginia Paulsen, a residential apartment tenant
living in Bellevue, Washington, filed a suit in King County
Superior Court against her landlord, Seamark Properties, Inc.2
Paulsen sought to establish her right under article I, section 5
of the Washington Constitution to post political campaign signs
in the window of her apartment without the interference or
attempted censorship of Seamark Properties.3
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Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV., 157, 190 (1985).
2. Paulsen v. Seamark Properties, Inc., No. 84-2-15311-3 (King County Sup. Ct.
April 9, 1985) (partial summary judgment entered) [hereinafter Paulsen]. The issue of
damages is reserved for trial.
3. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Damages, and Declaratory Judgment, Paulsen
[hereinafter Complaint].
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Virginia Paulsen signed a written lease with Seamark on
June 13, 1982, in which she agreed to rent a two-bedroom
apartment in the Westridge Apartments complex.4 Her apart-
ment was one of approximately eighty residential units located
in eight buildings at the complex.' Paulsen's apartment had
two windows overlooking 122nd Place N.E.6 Paulsen moved
into her apartment on July 7, 1982.'
In June or early July of 1984, Paulsen placed a political
campaign sign in one of the windows of her apartment.' The
sign proclaimed her support for a candidate in the Washington
State gubernatorial primary to be held on September 18, 1984.'
The cardboard sign measured two feet by three feet and was
imprinted with the name of the candidate and the words "FOR
GOVERNOR."'" The sign was visible from the street, from
the apartment complex parking lot, and from other tenants'
residences."
Toward the end of August, Paulsen placed a second sign in
the other window on the west side of her apartment. The sign
expressed her preference for a candidate for the United States
House of Representatives. 2 This second sign was of the same
size and construction as the first.'3
On September 14, 1984, Paulsen was approached by the
manager of the apartment complex. He informed her that the
owner of the apartments had seen her campaign signs and that
she was to take them down immediately. 4 Paulsen, fearing
possible eviction if she refused to comply, did as she was told
and immediately removed both campaign signs.'5 Four days
later, Paulsen went to the apartment manager's office and
requested an explanation for the owner's objection to her dis-
play of the political signs.' 6 The manager showed Paulsen a
copy of her lease agreement and pointed out the applicable
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Entry of Partial Summary
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provision in rule 13 of her lease: "No signs or placards shall be
posted in or about the apartment building without written per-
mission of the Landlord."' 7
Paulsen asked for, and was given, the name and address of
the corporate owner of the apartment complex so that she
could write and request permission to display her signs.'" That
same day, Paulsen wrote to the president of Seamark Proper-
ties, Inc. asking for permission to display her campaign signs:
My purpose in writing you is to ask for your written permis-
sion to continue having the signs in the windows indicating
my political support. These signs have been up since July
when I began working on the two campaigns. I have also
held political meetings in my apartment. If you gave your
permission, the signs would be removed when the polls close
on general election day, which I believe is November 6, 1984.
Were I renting [a] house or living in my own home, I
would have these signs posted on my property. Since the
property around my apartment does not belong to me, I
thought that the windows were the next most appropriate
place. I would appreciate having your written permission to
continue posting these signs. Thanks for your attention to
this matter.19
The next day, Seamark's president denied Paulsen's
request with the observation that "[i]f we allowed one person
to post a sign, we would have to allow everyone to do the same
"P20
On October 22, 1984 Paulsen filed suit in King County
Superior Court, seeking injunctive relief, damages, and a
declaratory judgment that Seamark had violated her right to
freely speak under article I, section 5 of the Washington Con-
stitution. The superior court agreed and on April 9, 1985, the
court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Paulsen.2 '
The court enjoined Seamark from preventing any tenant of the
Westridge Apartments from displaying political campaign signs
on the doors and windows of his or her apartment.22 In addi-
tion, the court declared that rule 13 in Paulsen's lease agree-
ment was an unlawful prior restraint on tenant freedom of
17. 1& at 4.
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Id at 5.
21. Order for Partial Summary Judgment, Paulsen.
22. Id,
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political expression.23 The issue of Paulsen's damages was
reserved for trial.24
Virginia Paulsen's case is not unique. As Justice Utter
predicted, tenants are "especially vulnerable" to censorship
imposed by their landlords.25 Every election year the Washing-
ton State chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union
receives numerous complaints from tenants regarding landlord
prohibitions against political campaign signs. This article will
outline the arguments to be made on behalf of residential ten-
ants who display political signs and who encounter threats of
eviction, rent increases, and other forms of landlord opposition.
In Section II, we describe the development of the general
principles of constitutional law applicable to disputes between
property owners and tenants who wish to use the property
owners' premises as a forum for the expression of the tenants'
ideas and beliefs. Tracing the history of the United States
Supreme Court rulings in this area, we analyze the waxing and
waning of first amendment speech rights, the development of
property-based first amendment speech rights, and the recogni-
tion of state constitutional free speech rights that are broader
than their first amendment counterparts.
In Section III, we analyze the application of freedom of
speech principles to disputes between landlords and residential
tenants, when the tenants wish to display political signs on the
leased property. Section III also presents and analyzes the
arguments frequently relied upon by landlords. For the bene-
fit of those tenants residing in states where state constitutional
free speech rights have not been liberally construed, we discuss
the common law property rights of tenants, citing reasons why
those rights are superior to the property rights of landlords in
the context of disputes over tenant political expression.
Finally, in Section IV, we conclude with an assessment of
the public policy justifications for refusing to enforce contrac-
23. Id.
24. Id, The case is still pending in King County Superior Court. Trial on the issue
of damages will probably be held in 1987.
25. At the same time that Paulsen filed her lawsuit, another tenant filed a similar
lawsuit against a Seattle landlord in Thompson v. Harrison, No. 84-2-15136-6 (King
County Super. Ct. 1984) [hereinafter Thompson]. The plaintiff in Thompson leased a
house for residential purposes. The defendant landlord refused to allow the tenant to
post lawn signs endorsing a candidate for President of the United States. Shortly after
the suit was filed, the landlord relented and gave the tenant permission to post the
signs. The tenant voluntarily dismissed the suit.
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tual waivers (such as rule 13 of the lease in Paulsen v. Sea-
mark) of a tenant's right to freedom of political expression.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SPEECH RIGHTS
A. The Rise and Fall of Marsh
In the beginning things were simple. First amendment
free speech rights were enforceable against governments but
not against private parties. There was no such thing as
abridgement of free speech by a private party. All this
changed with the 1946 Supreme Court decision of Marsh v.
Alabama.2 6
In Marsh, Gulf Shipbuilding, a private corporation, oper-
ated a company town called Chicksaw, a suburb of Mobile, Ala-
bama Gulf owned the town and employed a Mobile County
sheriff as the town's policeman.2" Gulf had written and posted
notices in the town stores with a warning similar to rule 13 of
Virginia Paulsen's lease agreement: "This is Private Property
and Without Written Permission, No Street or House Vendor,
Agent or Solicitation of any Kind Will Be Permitted. ' 29 In
contravention of the notice, Grace Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness,
entered the business district of Chicksaw, stood outside the
post office, and distributed religious literature. °
Gulf warned Marsh that she could not distribute religious
literature without a permit and that Gulf would not issue a
permit to her.3 1 Marsh objected that the company rule prohib-
iting the distribution of religious literature was unconstitu-
tional, and she refused to leave the sidewalk outside the
company post office.3 2 The company policeman arrested her.3
She was charged with and convicted of trespassing in violation
of Alabama State law. 4
The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
since the Gulf Corporation owned title to the sidewalk where
she stood, Marsh had trespassed upon private property. The
26. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
27. Id. at 502.
28. Id.
29. Id.




34. Id. at 504.
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court held that first amendment principles were inapplicable
because the sidewalk had not been irrevocably dedicated to the
town of Mobile. 5 The Alabama State Supreme Court denied
review.36 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the first amendment did apply even though Marsh was
distributing literature on private property without the land-
owner's consent.37
Justice Black, writing for the majority, first observed that
if the title to the sidewalk had belonged to a municipal govern-
ment, Marsh's conviction would be reversed because a munici-
pally owned sidewalk is a traditional public forum where first
amendment free speech rights must prevail.3 Thus, private
property owners in an ordinary town cannot constitutionally
set up a municipal government and pass an ordinance prohibit-
ing the distribution of religious literature. The question before
the Marsh Court was whether one powerful property owner,
acting alone, could do what other property owners, acting in
concert, could not do. "Our question narrows down to this,"
wrote Justice Black: "[c]an those people who live in or come to
Chicksaw be denied freedom of the press and religion simply
because a single company has legal title to all the town? '39
Answering the question in the negative, Justice Black
declared: "We do not agree that the corporation's property
interests settle the question."4 ° Black then advanced the the-
ory that by "opening up" its property to the public, Gulf lost
the right to claim absolute control over the activities conducted
on its property: "Ownership does not always mean absolute
dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitu-
tional rights of those who use it."'"
The company town of Chicksaw was open to the public.
Black noted that the business center of Chicksaw "serves as
the community shopping center and is freely accessible and
open to the people in the area and those passing through."42
35. Id. (citing State v. Marsh, 21 So. 2d 558 (1945)).
36. 246 Ala. 539, 21 So. 2d 564 (1945).
37. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509-10.
38. Id. at 504.
39. Id. at 505.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 506.
42. Id. at 508.
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Recognizing that "[m]any people in the United States live in
company-owned towns," the Marsh court held: "These people,
just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their
State and country ... there is no more reason for depriving
these people of the liberties guaranteed by the first and four-
teenth amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms
with respect to any other citizen."43
The Supreme Court concluded that the property rights of
the Gulf Shipping Corporation had to be balanced against the
free speech rights of Grace Marsh. In this weighing process,
Justice Black decreed that courts must "remain mindful of the
fact that the latter occupy a preferred position."44 Black con-
cluded that:
[t]he circumstance that the property rights to the premises
. . . were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to
justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a com-
munity of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liber-
ties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application
of a state statute.45
In an eloquent concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter
echoed Black's pronouncement that property rights did not
determine the scope of free speech rights: "Title to property as
defined by State law controls property relations; it cannot con-
trol issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a com-
pany town is a town as well as a congeries of property
relations.
'46
After Marsh came the shopping center case of Amalga-
mated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza.47 In Logan Val-
ley, members of a local food employees union picketed a
privately owned shopping center to protest the employment of
non-union workers in one of the shopping center businesses.48
A Pennsylvania trial court issued an injunction prohibiting fur-
43. Id. at 508-9.
44. Id at 509.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 511 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). If Marsh v. Alabama were still good
law today, cases like Paulsen would be relatively straightforward. Instead of a
company-town case, Paulsen's lawsuit presents the question of whether the owner of a
company-home can prevent the legal tenant from expressing his or her views. But, to
paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, title to the home cannot control the civil liberties
issues "precisely because a company-home rented to a tenant is still a home," even
though the leasing of that home gives rise to a "congeries of property relations."
47. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
48. Id at 311.
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ther picketing on grounds that the picketing constituted an
unlawful trespass on the property of the corporate owner of
the shopping center.49 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the injunction. 0 Relying heavily on Marsh, the
United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that
because the shopping center premises were open to the public
to the same extent as the commercial center of a normal town,
the shopping center owner could not curtail the union picket-
ers' free speech rights by obtaining an injunction against the
picketing.5 '
Justice Marshall began by summarizing the holding of
Marsh, "that under some circumstances property that is pri-
vately owned may, at least for first amendment purposes, be
treated as though it were publicly held." 2 Marshall also recog-
nized that a landowner's power to exclude others from his
property was normally "part and parcel of the rights tradition-
ally associated with the ownership of private property."53 Nev-
ertheless, even though the exclusion of others from the
owner's premises would normally be permissible, such an
exclusion is unconstitutional when done for the purpose of
excluding "those members of the public wishing to exercise
their first amendment rights on the premises in a manner and
for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the
property is actually put."'
In the phrase "generally consonant with the use to which
the property is actually put," however, the seeds of destruction
of the Marsh doctrine were sown. Justice Marshall went to
some lengths to explain that the union picketing was "conso-
nant" with the shopping center's general use. Marshall rea-
soned that the picketing was "directed specifically at patrons of
[a supermarket] located within the shopping center, and the
message sought to be conveyed to the public concerned the
manner in which that particular market was being operated. '55
After Logan Valley, it was only a matter of time before
the opportunity presented itself to cut back on the holding of
49. Id. at 312-13.
50. Id. at 313.
51. Id. at 325.
52. Id. at 316.
53. Id. at 319.
54. Id. at 319-20.
55. Id. at 320 n.9.
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Marsh. Four years later, in Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner,56 the
Court addressed the issue of "the right of a privately owned
shopping center to prohibit the distribution of handbills on its
property when the handbilling is unrelated to the shopping
center's operations."57 In Lloyd, the handbills that were dis-
tributed contained an invitation to a meeting of the "Resist-
ance Community" to protest the draft and the war in
Vietnam.58 Because the war in Vietnam was unrelated to the
operations of the shopping center, the Supreme Court held
that there was no first amendment free speech right to dis-
tribute literature without the consent of the owners.59
The Lloyd Court placed a narrow construction on the con-
cept of property "opened to the public." In both Marsh and
Logan Valley, the Court had stressed that if any member of
the public had physical access to the property, the property
was "open" to anyone. But in Lloyd, the Court placed a "pur-
pose" gloss on the concept of "open" property. Instead of
focusing on whether physical access to the property was lim-
ited, the Court focused on the subjective intentions of the
property owners that led to their decision to permit physical
access. In Lloyd, the Court found that the shopping center
owners allowed access to the public because they wanted peo-
ple to come and shop, not because they wanted to create a
forum for the discussion of foreign policy issues:
The obvious purpose, recognized widely as legitimate and
responsible business activity, is to bring potential shoppers to
the Center, to create a favorable impression, and to generate
goodwill. There is no open ended invitation to the public to
use the Center for any and all purposes, however incompati-
ble with the interests of both the stores and the shoppers
whom they serve.
6 0
The Lloyd Court apparently feared the implications of a
broad reading of Logan Valley because the Court derisively
commented that the handbillers' interpretation of the phrase
"open to the public" would, if accepted, "apply in varying
degrees to most retail stores and service establishments across
the country. They are all open to the public in the sense that
56. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
57. Id at 552.
58. Id. at 556.
59. Id. at 570.
60. Id at 565.
1986]
10 University of Puget Sound Law Review
customers and potential customers are invited and encouraged
to enter."'"
Finally, the Lloyd Court further tipped the scales in favor
of property owners by elevating the status of property rights to
a constitutional plane. Common law property rights, recog-
nized by state law, enjoy constitutional protection. The protec-
tion is afforded under the fifth amendment, which prohibits
the deprivation of property without due process of law: "[T]he
fifth and fourteenth amendment rights of private property
owners, as well as the first amendment rights of all citizens,
must be respected and protected. The Framers of the Consti-
tution certainly did not think these fundamental rights of a
free society are incompatible with each other."62
The Lloyd decision, had it endured, would have left Amer-
ican citizens with a first amendment free speech right that was
relatively diluted, but a right nonetheless. Under the Lloyd
Court's reasoning, one could not protest the Vietnam War at a
Safeway grocery store, but one could protest the military's use
of Boeing airplanes in the Vietnam War at a Boeing assembly
plant. As long as one could connect the message with the pri-
vate property forum, the Lloyd Court recognized the existence
of a first amendment free speech right that could be exercised
on private property.63
Lloyd, however, was short-lived. In Hudgens v. National
Labor Relations Board,' union members picketed their
employer's retail store which was located in a privately owned
shopping center. When the owner's agent told them that they
would be arrested for trespassing if they remained, the union
members left. The union's message was connected with the
normal use of the property being picketed. Thus, if the hold-
ing of Lloyd had been fairly applied, the picketers' first amend-
ment rights would have prevailed against the property rights
of the shopping center owner and his lessee, the union's
employer. But surprisingly, the Hudgens Court held that
Lloyd had overruled Logan Valley and that no first amend-
ment free speech right existed at all. The Hudgens Court gave
61. Id.
62. Id. at 570.
63. In the context of a landlord-tenant dispute, Lloyd would have been of little
benefit to someone like Ms. Paulsen. Unless she could connect the normal use of the
Westridge Apartments with the gubernatorial and congressional elections, Ms. Paulsen
would not have any cognizable first amendment right to post campaign signs.
64. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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a perfunctory nod to the holding of Marsh by reserving a small
exception for company-town cases, and proceeded to hold that
the first amendment had no application to purely private dis-
putes: "[W]hile statutory or common law may in some situa-
tions extend protection or provide redress against a private
corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expression
of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Con-
stitution itself.
6 5
Acknowledging that the Lloyd Court did not expressly
overrule Logan Valley, the Hudgens majority nevertheless
concluded, "[T]he fact is that the reasoning of the Court's opin-
ion in Lloyd cannot be squared with the reasoning of the
Court's opinion in Logan Valley." The Hudgens Court then
blithely stated that it had an "institutional duty" to "follow the
law." After invoking that sacred duty, the Court concluded
that in this case "following the law" meant overruling Logan
Valley since that is what the Lloyd decision had really done."
In a dissenting opinion that may have provided the spark
for future expansive readings of state constitutional free
speech guarantees, Justice Brennan criticized the Hudgens
majority for relying on "an overly formalistic view of the rela-
tionship between the institution of private ownership of prop-
erty and the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech.'6' Brennan acknowledged that "the values of privacy
and individual autonomy traditionally associated with" prop-
erty ownership called for some recognition of the right of prop-
erty owners to control the uses of their property.69 However,
Justice Brennan adhered to the idea developed in Marsh that
once a private property owner uses his property in a manner
that is not strictly private, he loses a degree of his autonomy.7 °
Harkening back to the decision in Munn v. Illinois,7 Brennan
65. Id. at 513.
66. Id. at 518.
67. Id. at 518. For further analysis of the death of Logan Valley, see Schauer,
Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in First Amendment Adjudication,
61 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1977); Recent Development, Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner:
Expression of First Amendment Rights in the Privately Owned Shopping Center, 22
CATH. U.L. REV. 807 (1971); Note, The Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise of
Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1973); Comment, The Public Forum From Marsh to Lloyd, 24
AM. U.L. REV. 159 (1974).
68. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 542 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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opined that private property becomes "clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public conse-
quence, and affect the community at large."72 Because the
public's interest in freedom of expression regarding business
and labor relations was, in his opinion, substantial, Brennan
concluded that the shopping mall owner's property interests
must yield to the overriding public interest in freedom of
expression.73
B. A Property Owner's Right to Remain Silent
At the same time that the Lloyd Court began to lean
toward overruling Logan Valley and the elimination of first
amendment rights enforceable against private parties, the
Supreme Court began to recognize a new kind of first amend-
ment right enforceable against government. This new type of
free speech right gave property owners the right to use their
property free from government orders compelling them to per-
mit others to use their property for speech purposes. Because
this right is a part of an owner's general property right to
determine how his property is used, we refer to it as a "prop-
erty-based" first amendment right to remain silent.
The first case to discuss a property owner's right to remain
silent was Wooley v. Maynard.74 George Maynard and his wife
Maxine were followers of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith. They
strenuously objected to a New Hampshire statute which made
it a crime for a motorist to obscure the figures and letters on
any vehicle license plate.75 The New Hampshire Supreme
Court interpreted the term "letters" to include the state
motto.7 6 Because that motto, "Live Free or Die," was repug-
nant to the Maynard's moral, religious and political beliefs
they covered it up.7 7 Mr. Maynard was then issued a citation
for violation of the New Hampshire misdemeanor statute. The
trial court found Maynard guilty and fined him $25.00.7' May-
nard continued, however, to cover up the state motto on his
license plates. He was issued a second citation, was again
found guilty, fined $50, and given a six-month suspended jail
72. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 543 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877)).
73. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 543.
74. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
75. Id. at 707.
76. Id. at 707 (citing State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972)).
77. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
78. Id. at 708.
[Vol. 10:1
Tenant Political Speech Rights
sentence.79 Maynard informed the court that as a matter of
conscience, he would not pay the fine. The court then sen-
tenced Maynard to fifteen days in jail. Maynard served his
sentence.8°
Because Maynard still had no intention of complying with
the law, he filed a civil rights suit in federal district court seek-
ing an injunction and declaratory relief against enforcement of
the New Hampshire statute.8' A three-judge District Court
granted the requested injunction.8 2  The United States
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a state may not require
an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideologi-
cal message by displaying the message on his private property
in a manner and for the express purpose that the message be
observed and read by the public.83
Relying on the flag salute case of Board of Education v.
Barnette,84 the Court reaffirmed the principle that the first
amendment guarantees both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all.8 5 The Court held that the
New Hampshire statute effectively compelled the Maynards to
"use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the
State's ideological message . ".8.."6 This violated Maynard's
first amendment right to remain silent and to refuse to partici-
pate in the dissemination of the message "Live Free or Die."
The Wooley Court also relied on its prior decision in
Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo,8" where the
Court struck down a Florida statute that imposed a duty upon
newspapers to publish the replies of political candidates whom
they had criticized.88 The Miami Herald decision appeared to
79. I&
80. Id.
81. Id. at 709.
82. Id,
83. Id. at 717.
84. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Court held that public school students could not be
forced to salute the American flag in daily ceremonies.
85. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. See also Pacific Gas & Electric v. California Public
Utilities Commission, - U.S. -, -, 106 S.Ct. 903, 909 (1986) (The Court held that a
Utilities Commission's order requiring the utility company to place a third party's
newsletter in billing envelopes impermissibly burdened the utility company's first
amendment rights); and Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, - U.S. -, -, 105 S. Ct.
2218, 2230 (1985) (quoting Estate of Hemmingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341,
348, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)).
86. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
87. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
88. Id. at 258.
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contradict the Court's prior decision in Red Lion Broadcasting
v. Federal Communications Commission.9 In Red Lion, the
Court had upheld a federal regulation that compelled a pri-
vately owned radio station to furnish cost free reply time to an
individual criticized in the course of a radio program. If pri-
vately owned radio stations could be compelled to allow free
air time to people they criticized, why should privately owned
newspapers not be subject to the same type of governmental
regulation? One commentator has suggested that the key dif-
ference between radio stations and newspapers is that radio
stations have no property interest in their broadcasting license:
[B]y statute .... Congress had presumed to assert national
ownership over the airwaves, further providing that no per-
son, company or licensee could acquire any 'property' in
those airwaves .... In Florida, there was, of course, no
equivalent statute precluding conventional private owner-
ship of the newsprint on which the Miami Herald was
printed: that ownership was complete, it carried with it full
first amendment protections, and the state right-of-reply
statute was correspondingly an abridgement of the newspa-
per's private property rights and freedom of speech: to
exclude access by third parties.90
Returning to landlord-tenant dispute over the display of
political signs, we are faced with a conflict between two oppos-
ing property-based free speech rights. The landlord has title to
the property; the tenant owns a leasehold interest in the home
or apartment. Since both have property rights in the same
premises, both have valid claims to first amendment property-
based free speech rights. On the one hand, if the tenant wishes
to display a campaign sign endorsing a particular candidate, the
landlord arguably has a first amendment property-based right
to prohibit the sign's display because the landlord does not
wish to participate in the dissemination of the message. On the
other hand, if the landlord wants to display a sign endorsing
his candidate, the tenant arguably has a first amendment prop-
erty-based right to prohibit the display because he does not
89. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
90. Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Propert Rights as the Foremost Principle
of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
66, 77 (1980). Van Alstyne concluded that property rights are becoming an important
source of free speech rights. "[The security of private property as an extension of
oneself and the corresponding liberty of free speech with respect to ownership of that
private property, is a clear and powerful development of the seventies." Id.
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wish to participate in the dissemination of the landlord's
message. Whose first amendment property-based free speech
right is superior will depend, in part, upon an analysis of
whose common law property rights are superior during the
term of a lease. We shall later argue that the tenant's property
right is superior because the common law rule allows the ten-
ant the right to use the property for all lawful uses that do not
constitute waste.91
C. State Constitutional Free Speech Rights
Wholly aside from federal constitutional free speech
issues, the Supreme Court decided in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins92 that state courts could interpret state consti-
tutional free speech provisions in such a manner as to recog-
nize that state free speech rights are enforceable against
private parties. Thus, even though Hudgens had put an end to
the Marsh doctrine for purposes of the first amendment, state
courts were free to endow their citizens with speech rights
enforceable against private property owners.
In Pruneyard, the Court affirmed the decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. The California high court held that the
state constitutional free speech rights of private shopping
center users were superior to the conflicting claims of the
property owner.93 The plaintiff in that case, Michael Robins,
had been told to leave the shopping center because he had
been soliciting signatures from the shopping center patrons for
a petition addressed to the President of the United States.94
The California court held that under the California Constitu-
tion, Robins had a right to use the property for collecting peti-
tion signatures, despite the objections of the shopping mall
owner.
In upholding the state court decision in Pruneyard, the
United States Supreme Court also addressed two fundamental
constitutional questions concerning conflicts between free
speech rights and property rights. First, the Court determined
that it was constitutionally permissible for California to bur-
den the property rights of the shopping center owner with
91. See infra notes 186-192 and accompanying text.
92. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
93. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979).
94. Id at 855. The petition voiced opposition to a United Nations resolution
concerning "Zionism."
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additional speech forum responsibilities.95 The previous deci-
sions in Lloyd and Hudgens had established that first amend-
ment speech rights would not be extended to the users of a
private shopping center. The reasoning of those cases did not,
however, require that existing constitutionally protected prop-
erty rights would preclude the states from imposing additional
speech-related burdens upon private property owners. 96
Instead, the Court reasoned that because the the allocation of
various property rights was within the authority of the states,97
the states have a wide range of discretion in the exercise of
this authority. With the announcement of the decision in
Pruneyard, matters of conflicting speech rights and property
rights became, in the first instance, subjects of state constitu-
tional and legislative concern.98 Thus, the first principle to be
derived from Pruneyard is that the state courts and legisla-
tures are the initial forum for the resolution of disputes con-
cerning conflicting property interests and speech interests.
The second principle of Pruneyard concerns the constitu-
tionality of the state's action in regard to the property-based
95. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81-85.
96. Id. at 81. The Court distinguished its holding in Lloyd on the grounds that
"there was no state constitutional or statutory provision that had been construed to
create rights to the use of private property by strangers ......
97. Id. at 84. "Nor as a general proposition is the United States, as opposed to the
several States, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define 'property' in the
first instance." Id. at 88 (Blackmun, J., concurring). However, the concurring opinion
of one justice expressly disapproved of this statement of the law.
98. Many courts and commentators interpreted the Court's holding in Pruneyard
as an invitation to include speech rights within the corpus of the "New Federalism."
See, e.g., Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 106 A.D.2d 189, 194, 484 N.Y.S.2d 849, 853
(1985) ("The Supreme Court has encouraged states to place a greater emphasis upon
the independent role of their own constitutions ....... ); Cologne v. Westfarms
Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 58, 469 A.2d 1201, 1206 (1984) ("This invitation to state courts
to construe state constitutional guaranties to enhance freedom of expression above the
minimum federal constitutional level .. "); Note, Granting Access to Private
Shopping Center Property for Free Speech Purposes, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 507 (1981);
Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L. J. 165
(1980) (hereinafter cited as Private Abridgment). Much has been written of the "New
Federalism," the recent trend that bases civil liberties upon state-granted rights and
policies. Two seminal articles are: Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977) and Howard, State Courts and
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976). On
the subject of the role of freedom of expression in the "New Federalism," see
Developments in the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1324, 1398-1429 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Developments). A leading article
was written on this issue by Professor Countryman in 1970. See Countryman, The Role
of a Bill of Rights in a Modern State Constitution: Why a State Bill of Rights? 45
WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970).
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first amendment speech rights of the property owner.99 The
shopping mall owner, relying on Wooley v. Maynard, argued
that he had a first amendment right not to be forced by Cali-
fornia to use his property as a forum for the speech of
others."° The Supreme Court distinguished Wooley, however,
on several grounds. First, New Hampshire had forced Mr.
Maynard to openly display a message that was objectionable to
him by requiring that he place it on his "personal property,"
his car. This property was used in his daily life. 10 1 A shopping
center, however, unlike a car, is not a "personal" item, used
only by its owner.1 2 New Hampshire had refused to allow Mr.
Maynard to cover the motto on the license plate. But in Rob-
ins nothing prevented the shopping center owner from disasso-
ciating himself from the message conveyed by the plaintiff by
simply posting signs in the area where the handbillers stood,
disclaiming any sponsorship of their message.'0 3
Paradoxically, in the course of distinguishing Robins from
Wooley, the Court observed that where Maynard alone had
access to the use of his car, "the shopping center by choice of
its owner is not limited to the personal use of [the owners]. It
is instead a business establishment that is open to the public to
come and go as they please.' 0 4 This comment constitutes
quite a retreat from the Court's earlier position in Lloyd that
shopping center owners intend to open their premises to peo-
ple who come to shop, but not to people who come to protest,
proselytize or handbill.
In any event, the Pruneyard Court concluded that the
state constitutional free speech right was superior to the first
amendment property-based free speech right of the shopping
center owner.
D. The Analysis of Conflicting Rights after Pruneyard
Our review of United States Supreme Court precedents is
now complete. The conflict between landlords and tenants can
be analyzed as a clash between rights. The tenant who is for-
tunate enough to reside in a state like California or Washing-
ton, where state constitutional rights are liberally construed,
99. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 85-87.
100. Id at 85-86.
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may have a state constitutional right to freedom of speech that
is enforceable against private parties. That tenant is also
endowed with a first amendment property-derived free speech
right, based upon his property interest in the leasehold.
Finally, the tenant has a common law property right to use the
leased premises for any lawful use that does not constitute
waste or nuisance.
On the landlord's side of the ledger, we have the property
owner's traditional right to exclude others from the use of his
property, subject only to the police power of the state. °5 The
landlord also has a first amendment property-based free
speech right. Therefore, the conflict is no longer one of prop-
erty rights versus speech rights. Rather, it is a matter of both
mutual and conflicting interests: the speech and property
rights of the owner versus the speech and property rights of
the invited public."°6
It should now be evident that the distinction between
"property rights" and "speech rights" is no longer a helpful
one. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has already rec-
ognized this in another context:
The federal courts have been particularly bedeviled by
"mixed" cases in which both personal and property rights
are implicated, and the line between them has been difficult
to draw with any consistency or principled objectivity. The
case before us presents a good example of the conceptual dif-
ficulties created by the test.
Such difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between
personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Prop-
erty does not have rights. People have rights .... In fact, a
fundamental interdependence exists between the personal
right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither
could have meaning without the other.0 7
The Pruneyard decision has revealed one method by
which these conflicts might be resolved: an affirmative state
105. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
179-180 (1979)).
106. The interests are mutual since both parties have a contemporaneous interest
in the same real property together with the property-based right to expression arising
out of this joint property interest. The interests conflict when exercised in differing
and mutually exclusive manners (e.g., where one party exercises his right by posting a
particular political message and the other party exercises his right by excluding that
particular message).
107. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
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constitutional policy favoring individual expression. 10 8  Since
Pruneyard, at least nine state courts have addressed this issue
of speech and property rights as a matter of state constitu-
tional, statutory or common law.10 9 As in Pruneyard, six of
these decisions involved speech activity on shopping center
property." 0 Of the other three, two involved private university
property,"' and the last involved public fairgrounds." 2 To
date, the courts have split evenly in the resolution of these
cases.
1 3
Many more jurisdictions will be addressing this issue in
the near future." 4 Undoubtedly, a number of different private
property forums will be considered in the course of these deci-
108. Even without such a constitutional policy, however, it must be emphasized
that substantial issues of rights to use remain; thus, state courts must investigate the
property rights basis for the claim to free expression.
109. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984) (women's
organization sought permission to solicit persons visiting shopping center to sign
petitions in support of Equal Rights Amendment); Batchelder v. Allied Stores, 388
Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (Congressional candidate sought permission to solicit
signatures and distribute leaflets in a shopping center); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens
Lobby, 128 Mich. App. 649, 341 N.W.2d 174 (1983) (citizens group restrained from
soliciting shoppers, gathering signatures, distributing literature, and making speeches
on premises of shopping center); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980)
(defendant prosecuted for trespass upon private property when he distributed and sold
leaflets on private university campus); Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 106 A.D.2d
189, 484 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1985) (anti-nuclear group sought permission to distribute leaflets
on premises of shopping center); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C.173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981)
(defendant charged with trespass when he solicited signatures for a draft protest in
shopping center parking lot); Oklahomans for Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Oklahoma,
Inc., 634 P.2d 704 (Okla. 1981) (anti-abortion group sought damages when state fair
refused to allow exhibit of abortion educational materials); Commonwealth v. Tate,
495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981) (anti-war group prosecuted for defiant trespass when
they attempted to distribute leaflets on college campus); Alderwood Associates v.
Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (Environmental Council
enjoined from soliciting signatures and demonstrating in shopping mall).
110. Cologne, 192 Conn. at 52, 469 A.2d at 1203; Batchelder, 388 Mass. at 85, 445
N.E.2d at 591; Woodland, 128 Mich. App. at 651; 341 N.W.2d at 175; Shad Alliance, 106
A.D.2d at 190-96, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 850-51; Felmet, 302 N.C. at 177, 273 S.E.2d at 712;
Alder-wood Associates, 96 Wash. 2d at 231, 635 P.2d at 110.
111. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 541, 423 A.2d at 618; Tate, 495 Pa. 163, 432 A.2d at 1385.
112. Oklahomans for Life, 634 P.2d at 705-06.
113. Five courts have resolved the dispute in favor of the user of the property. See
Batchelder, 388 Mass. at 93, 445 N.E.2d at 595; Schmid, 84 N.J. at 556-57, 423 A.2d at
626; Shad Alliance, 106 A.D.2d at 200-01, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 857; Tate, 495 Pa. at 175, 432
A.2d at 1390; Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 246, 635 P.2d at 117. Four courts have
resolved the dispute in favor of the property owner. See Cologne, 192 Conn. at 66, 469
A.2d at 1210; Woodland, 128 Mich. App. at 654, 341 N.W.2d at 176; Felmet 302 N.C. at
178, 273 S.E.2d 712; Oklahomans for Life, 634 P.2d at 708.
114. At least 39 state constitutions contain free speech provisions that provide an
affirmative individual right to speech. Utter, supra note 1 at 158 n.3 (listing the states
with affirmative free speech language).
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sions. These forums may include apartment complexes,
planned communities, mobile home parks, nursing homes and
agricultural labor camps.11 In the following section, we dis-
cuss both the state constitutional basis116 and the common law
property rights basis" 7 for the resolution of this issue, in the
context of a landlord-tenant dispute in Washington State.
III. STATE COURT RESOLUTION OF THE RESIDENTIAL
TENANT'S RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION
A. The Affirmative Constitutional Right to State Protection
Against Private Abridgment of Freedom of Speech
In Washington, the Supreme Court has held that the state
constitution protects a citizen's right to freedom of speech from
both governmental and private intrusions. In Alderwood Asso-
ciates v. Environmental Council,"8 a plurality of the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that unlike the first amendment,
article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution has no "state
action" requirement that must be met before the state consti-
tutional guarantee of free speech comes into play.
1 9
Article I, section 5 provides: "Every person may freely
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right." In Alderwood, the Washington
Supreme Court observed that, in contrast to the first amend-
ment, article I, section 5 "is not by its express terms limited to
governmental actions."' 20 Relying upon prior decisions of the
California and New Jersey Supreme Courts, the Alderwood
plurality held: "[W]e choose to follow the approach of Schmid
and Robins which recognizes that the 'state action' analysis of
the fourteenth amendment is required by the language of the
federal, but not the state, constitution. '"121
The plurality justices observed that article I, section 5 of
the Washington Constitution is substantially similar to both
the California Constitution, article I, section 2 and New Jersey
115. Utter, supra note 1, at 190.
116. See inkfra notes 116-183 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 184-210 and accompanying text.
118. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
119. Justice Dolliver, who concurred in the result, did not support this position.
96 Wash. 2d at 247, 635 P.2d at 118.
120. Id. at 240, 635 P.2d at 114.
121. Id. at 243, 635 P.2d at 115-16 (citing to State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d
615 (1980) and Robins v. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74, (1980)).
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Constitution, article I, section 6.122 "In fact, section 5" of the
Washington Constitution "was modeled after" the analogous
California constitutional provision.
123
In Robins v. Pruneyard,2 4 the California Supreme Court
held that its state constitution prohibited the owners of a pri-
vate shopping mall from interfering with the attempts of high
school students to solicit customer signatures for a petition
voicing opposition to a United Nations resolution on "Zionism."
Similarly, in State v. Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a private college, Princeton University, could not pre-
vent members of the United States Labor Party from distribut-
ing socialist literature on campus.125 As Justice Utter noted in
his plurality opinion in Alderwood, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that its state constitution "imposed upon the state
government an affirmative obligation to protect fundamental
individual rights."'12 6 The New Jersey court's analysis reflects a
key distinction between the theoretical framework of state
constitutions vis-a-vis the federal constitution.127 The federal
Bill of Rights manifests a single-minded purpose, to ensure
freedom from governmental interference in private affairs.
State constitutions manifest two purposes; to secure freedom
from state governmental interference, and to impose an obliga-
tion upon state governments to protect citizens' freedoms
against private abridgment as well. 28
As Justice Utter has noted,'- 9 this second purpose of
imposing an affirmative obligation of protection upon state
governments is readily discernible in the Washington Constitu-
tion, article I, section 1, which provides: "All political power is
122. The constitutions of these states both provide:
Every person may freely speak, write, and publish his [or her] sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for abuse of this right. A law may not
restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6. Only the California Constitution con-
tains the added words "or her."
123. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 240-41, 635 P.2d at 114.
124. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
125. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
126. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 241 n.6, 635 P.2d at 115 n.6.
127. For a theoretical analysis of the Alderwood plurality opinion and the
normative justifications for this distinction, see Skover, The Washington Constitution
'State Action' Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 221, 240-250 (1985).
128. See generally Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157, 163-166 nn. 39-50 (1985) (hereinafter cited as Utter).
129. Alderwood Associates, 96 Wash. 2d at 241, n.6, 635 P.2d 115 n.6.
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inherent in the people, and governments derive their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed, and are established to
protect and maintain individual rights." Because the Washing-
ton State government was established "to protect and maintain
individual rights,' 130 the scope of this protective shield must
necessarily reach beyond governmental action to encompass
protection against private interference with individual rights.
To hold otherwise would amount to the paradoxical assertion
that the state government was established solely to protect citi-
zens against itself, an end which could most easily be achieved
by doing away with state government altogether.
The Schmid decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
like the Robins decision of the California Supreme Court,
applied this theory of an affirmative governmental obligation
when it held the state responsible for protecting freedom of
speech against private abridgment.131 Since the decision by the
Washington Supreme Court in Alderwood Associates, courts of
other jurisdictions have also adopted this position.132
Historical research concerning the origins of article I, sec-
tion 5 also supports the conclusion that the framers of the
Washington Constitution deliberately chose not to include any
state action requirement. The first draft of article I, section 5
provided: "That no law shall be passed restraining the free
exercise of opinion or restricting the right to speak, write or
print freely on any subject." '133 But the second draft proposed
by the Bill of Rights Committee "substantially altered the first
draft of the free speech provision to eliminate the state action
language."' 34 As Justice Utter has commented, "[T]he adop-
tion and subsequent deletion of the express state action
requirement in the Washington Committee's first draft
strongly suggest an awareness and rejection of such a require-
ment for the state free-speech provision. ' 135 Thus, the avail-
130. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
131. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 559, 423 A.2d at 628: "[T]he rights of speech and
assembly guaranteed by the State Constitution are protectable not only against
governmental or public bodies, but under some circumstances against private persons
as well." Id.
132. See Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 118 Misc. 2d 841, 462 N.Y.S.2d 344
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8); Batchelder v. Allied Stores International,
388 Mass. 83, 455 N.E.2d 90 (1983) (MASS. CONST., art. I, § 9); Commonwealth v. Tate,
495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981) (PA. CONST., art. I, § 7 and art. I, § 20).
133. Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 13, 1889, at 4, col. 3 (emphasis added).
134. Utter, supra note 128, at 174.
135. Id. at 177.
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able legislative history buttresses the conclusion reached by
the Alderwood plurality: article I, section 5 protects citizens
against private abridgement of their right to freedom of
speech.
B. Justifying the Imposition of Incidental Burdens on
Landlords: The Compelling Societal Interest in the
Promotion of the Freedom of Expression
The Alderwood doctrine is particularly appropriate in situ-
ations where private parties seek to place limitations upon
speech in residential communities that are owned or managed
by one party, and occupied by others. Justice Utter has recog-
nized the danger to freedom of speech posed by landlords who
seek to silence their tenants: "The exercise of free speech
rights may be especially vulnerable in privately owned or man-
aged communities, mobile home parks, nursing homes, and
agricultural labor camps.' 1 3 6 The vulnerability of the residen-
tial tenant is a direct result of the landlord's power to exact a
high price for the exercise of the right to freely speak. The
landlord who forces the tenant to accept eviction as the price
for the expression of his political beliefs has the ability to
impose a blanket of silence on all but the most zealous or afflu-
ent tenants.
In one Washington case involving landlord suppression of
tenant political speech, a superior court judge ruled that the
landlord's ability to impose a rule of silence on his tenants jus-
tified the recognition of the plaintiff tenant's right to assert not
only her own free speech rights, but also the rights of her
more timid tenant neighbors:
The chilling effect that would otherwise be imposed on
the tenants' freedom of speech justifies the recognition of
[plaintiff's] standing to assert the rights of others. The fear
of possible eviction is generally equivalent to the fear of loss
of employment. Potential loss of one's residence, like loss of
one's job, constitutes a serious potential injury that can have
a grave chilling effect on the exercise of the right of freedom
of speech. 1 3
7
136. Utter, supra note 128, at 190.
137. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Entry of Partial Summary
Judgment for Plaintiff at 7, Paulsen v. Seamark Properties, Inc., No. 84-2-15311-3
(King County Super. Ct. April 9, 1985) (partial summary judgment entered)
[hereinafter FFCL].
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In addition to the vulnerability of residential tenants, the
broad power of one landlord to silence a multitude of voices
argues heavily in favor of constitutional protection against such
landlord censorship. "If left unregulated, the owner could
restrict the rights of the residents to assemble, speak, demon-
strate, or advocate within their own community.' 13 There is
no sound reason why property owners should be given the
power to silence property renters solely on the ground that the
owner retains a property interest in the homes occupied by
others. The bundle of rights associated with ownership of the
fee interest in realty need not, and should not, carry with it a
concomitant right to dictate to residential tenants what they
can say while domiciled upon the land.
In Alderwood, the Washington Supreme Court held that in
assessing the relative claims of property owners against the
free speech claims of others, courts should employ a balancing
approach that gives special deference to the exercise of free
speech. The court looked to "the use and nature of the private
property," the extent to which the property is "open to the
public," and "the nature of the speech activity.' 1 39 "The exer-
cise of free speech is given great weight in the balance," the
court said, "because it is a preferred right."'4 ° In Alderwood,
the speech was related to the initiative process and the electo-
ral system. The petitioner, the Washington Environmental
Council, was attempting to collect signatures to place The
Radioactive Waste Storage and Transportation Act of 1980 on
the statewide ballot as Citizen's Initiative 383. The Washington
Supreme Court plurality observed that since the petitioner's
speech activity involved the initiative process, it took on
"added constitutional significance." '141
In two King County cases filed in the fall of 1984 by resi-
dential tenants against their landlords, the suppressed speech
concerned political signs. The signs endorsed candidates for
president and vice-president of the United States, for governor
of the State of Washington, and for the United States Con-
gress.142 Speech of this nature, relating to general elections,
deserves the highest order of constitutional protection; electo-
138. Utter, supra note 128, at 190-91.
139. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 635 P.2d at 116.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 245, 635 P.2d at 116.
142. Paulsen v. Seamark Properties, Inc., No. 84-2-15311-3 (King County Super. Ct.
April 9, 1985) (partial summary judgment entered) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen];
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ral speech, like initiative-related speech, has an independent
claim to constitutional protection under the Washington State
Constitution. 43
It is well established that private property may, within
constitutional bounds, be subject to state-imposed burdens or
restrictions designed to further the general public welfare," so
long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without just
compensation. ' 144 In Robins, the California Supreme Court
held that its state constitution imposed constitutionally permis-
sible burdens on property owners in order to promote and pro-
tect the rights of freedom of speech and freedom to petition:
"To protect free speech and petitioning is surely a goal that
matches the protecting of health and safety, the environment,
esthetics, property values and other societal goals that have
been held to justify reasonable restrictions on private property
rights.' 1
45
In the context of residential leases, a landlord in Washing-
ton State is compelled, by both state and federal law, to offer
the premises for lease to any member of the public, without
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, or national ori-
gin.146 By placing property on the market for lease, a property
owner invites the public to make use of his property. This
opening of the property to the class of prospective tenants
necessitates a corresponding response of state constitutional
protection for tenants who seek to express their opinions on
political issues while residing in the rented premises. As the
Washington Supreme Court plurality held in Alderwood,
"When property is open to the public, the owner has a reduced
expectation of privacy and, as a corollary, any speech activity is
less threatening to the property's value. 
' 147
In an analogous situation, the Washington Court of
Appeals has recognized that "[w]here one opens one's home to
the public by engaging in the rental of rooms therein for mon-
etary gain, one must be deemed to have voluntarily
subordinated personal privacy rights to those state interests
Thompson v. Harrison, No. 84-2-15136-6 (King County Super. Ct. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Thompson].
143. See infra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
144. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
145. Robins v. Pruneyard, 23 Cal.3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d 341, 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854,
859 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
146. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.222 (1985).
147. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 635 P.2d at 116.
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which can be shown to be compelling.' 1 4 A homeowner may
racially discriminate with respect to those persons whom he
invites to dinner in his own house. But a homeowner who does
not live on the premises, and who invites the public to rent the
home for residential purposes, cannot claim any constitutional
right to discriminate against the tenants to whom he will rent
on the basis of race. The homeowner's autonomy to control
the uses of his property may be constitutionally subordinated
to the compelling state interest in "the eradication of social dis-
parity created by racial discrimination.' ' 49 Similarly, the land-
lord's power to control the uses of his property may also be
constitutionally subordinated to the compelling state obligation
to affirmatively protect tenants wishing to exercise their free-
dom of speech.
Finally, the use of property as a residence weighs heavily
toward tipping the Alderwood balancing scales in favor of ten-
ants' free speech rights. If a tenant cannot express political
views in his or her own home, without fear of landlord evic-
tion or reprisal, then freedom of expression will be markedly
curtailed. There is simply not enough affordable housing for
all citizens to be able to own their own homes. If the Alder-
wood balancing scales tip in favor of landlords, the political
arena will lose the speaking participation of the thousands of
registered voters who rent their homes.
The 1980 United States Census collected the following
information regarding the numbers of residential tenants in
Seattle,15 ° King County, 5' and Washington State:5 2
148. Voris v. Human Rights Comm'n., 41 Wash. App. 283, 290, 704 P.2d 632, 636
(1985) (court held that landlord engaged in unfair practice to refuse to enter into real
estate transaction with person because of race).
149. Id. at 290, 704 P.2d at 636.
150. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Pub. No. PHC80-2-329,
Census of Population and Housing, Seattle-Everett, Wash. SMSA Census Tracts, Table
H-i, (1980).
151. Id.
152. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Pub. No. PHC80-S2-49,
Census of Population and Housing Advance Estimates of Social, Economic and
Housing Characteristics in Washington, Table H-1, (Supp. 1980).
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Renter-occupied units in












In summary, the residential nature of the property, the
public invitation to rent the premises, the political nature of
election-related speech, the large numbers of residential ten-
ants, and the preferred position of freedom of speech in our
governmental system, all weigh heavily in favor of recognizing
tenants' claims to freedom of speech as superior to the prop-
erty rights of landlords.
C. A Requirement of Advance Landlord Consent to Tenant
Political Speech Activities Constitutes an Invalid
Prior Restraint upon the Exercise of
Constitutionally Protected Speech
Landlords may differ in their approaches to tenant polit-
ical expression. Some may attempt to completely ban all polit-
ical signs and messages, regardless of the content of the speech.
Others may attempt to control tenant speech activities by
requiring tenants to obtain their advance permission, thus
establishing themselves as censors of tenant political expres-
sion. In one case litigated in King County Superior Court, a
Bellevue landlord for an apartment complex included the fol-
lowing standard provision in all of his leases: "No signs or
placards shall be posted in or about the apartment building
without written permission of the Landlord.1 1 53 Such "advance
permission" requirements clearly constitute prior restraints
that are constitutionally invalid.
In addressing this issue, the Washington Supreme Court
has forcefully held that the "language of the Washington Con-
stitution absolutely forbids prior restraints against the publica-
153. FFCL at 4, Paulsen.
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tion or broadcast of constitutionally protected speech."' 54 In
State v. Coe, the court noted that "unlike the first amendment
to the United States Constitution, the plain language of the
Washington Constitution, article I, section 5 seems to rule out
prior restraints under any circumstances .... "155 Justice
Utter, writing for a six justice majority, noted that this absolu-
tist approach was consistent with the court's plurality ruling in
Alderwood Associates, "that under Const. art. 1, section 5, free
speech is a 'preferred right' when balanced against other con-
stitutional rights. 1
5 6
Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional.'57
The prohibition against prior restraints was designed to
achieve "the abolishment of censorship. .."15 and there can be
no valid justification for distinguishing between censorship
imposed by courts and legislatures, and censorship imposed by
one's landlord. If landlords were allowed to exercise prior
restraint, then we might find ourselves subject to a new form
of segregation, where Democrats must rent from Democratic
landlords and Republicans must rent from Republican land-
lords, in order to "freely speak" on political issues, without
fear of eviction or punitive rent increases.
The absolute ban against prior restraints imposed by arti-
cle I, section 5 is not applicable to speech that is not constitu-
tionally protected, such as obscenity5 9 or fighting words. 6 0
But it is beyond dispute that a tenant's act of displaying polit-
ical preference signs endorsing candidates and initiatives is
constitutionally protected speech of the highest order. Thus,
"advance permission" rules which purport to require prior
154. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 375, 679 P.2d 353, 360 (1984).
155. Id. at 374, 679 P.2d at 359 (emphasis in original).
156. Id. at 375, 679 P.2d at 360 (citing Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 635
P.2d at 116).
157. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d at 372, 679 P.2d at 358; State v. Reyes, 104 Wash. 2d 35, 43,
700 P.2d 1155, 1160 (1985) (statute prohibiting insulting or abusing teacher was
overbroad and void for vagueness); State ex rel. Super. Ct. v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69,
76, 483 P.2d 608, 612 (1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971) (trial court order limiting
news coverage of criminal trial was limitation on reporter's freedom to write and was
presumed constitutionally invalid).
158. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d at 376, 679 P.2d at 361 (quoting Dailey v. Superior Court,
112 Cal. 94, 97, 44 P.458, 459 (1896)).
159. See Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wash. 2d 747, 757, 505 P.2d 126, 132 (1973) (citing
Fine Arts Guild v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 2d 503, 445 P.2d 602 (1968) (distribution of obscene
material)).
160. See State v. Reyes, 104 Wash. 2d 35, 41, 700 P.2d 1155, 1158-59 (1985) (quoting
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
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landlord consent to tenant political expression, clearly violate
article I, section 5. Such rules are invalid prior restraints. 6 1 A
landlord may, consistent with the language of article I, section
5, pursue a post-publication remedy when he can show an
abuse of the right,16 2 but he may not restrain speech for fear
that abuses may occur. A tenant's mouth may "not be closed
in advance for the purpose of preventing an utterance of his
sentiments, however mischevious the prospective results of
such utterance" may be.
163
D. Landlord Restrictions on Tenant Speech Related to
Elections Also Violates the Article I, Section 19
Guarantee of Free and Equal Elections
In Alderwood Associates, the plurality noted that the shop-
ping mall owners' refusal to permit signature collection on
their premises effectively impeded the initiative process. Thus,
in addition to violating article I, section 5,164 the shopping mall
owner also violated article II, section 1(a), the initiative guar-
antee of the Washington Constitution. 65 The desire of resi-
dential tenants to post political campaign signs similarly
impacts a constitutional guarantee designed to protect the
integrity and freedom of our republican form of government.
Initiatives speak to legislation and to a specific issue. General
elections concern candidates for a specific position. Both con-
cern the republican political process.'6 6
Article I, section 19 bluntly provides: "All elections shall
be free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any
time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of
suffrage."
In the recent case of Foster v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation
161. In Paulsen, the Honorable Rosselle Pekelis invalidated such a rule, holding
that it was "unconstitutional, null and void, because it violates article I, section 5 by
requiring the advance written permission of the landlord before signs can be displayed.
This constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech." FFCL at 9,
Paulsen.
162. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d at 374, 679 P.2d at 359.
163. Id. at 377, 679 P.2d at 361 (quoting Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. at 100, 44
P. at 460).
164. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 239-40, 635 P.2d at 114.
165. The initiative guarantee set forth in amendment seven to the Washington
Constitution provides: "The first power reserved by the people is the initiative."
166. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 252-53, 635 P.2d at 120-21 (Dolliver, J.,
concurring).
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District,16 a unanimous Washington Supreme Court held that
the rights of Washington citizens under article I, section 19 are
substantially greater than the parallel rights guaranteed by the
federal constitution.16 The Foster court noted that the United
States Supreme Court has upheld departures from the princi-
ple of one-person one-vote, required by the federal constitu-
tion, when the election at issue concerns special purpose
municipal districts. In two of these cases, the Court has upheld
laws which gave the right to vote to landowners only. The
court reasoned that landowners were more impacted by the
decisions that were rendered by the "special purpose" govern-
mental agency.
169
In Foster, the Washington Supreme Court criticized the
rationale of these United States Supreme Court decisions. The
Court found them to be "inconsistent with Const., art. 1, sec-
tion 19" because they created two classes of citizens, landown-
ers and non-landowners, without recognizing the impact that
decisions of a water irrigation district agency would have on
both classes:
The . . . Court's narrow focus upon the original irriga-
tion purpose of the district caused it to recognize only the
interests of landowners. Yet the district also generated and
supplied electricity to approximately 240,000 consumers and
derived 98 percent of its total operating revenue from this
activity. Thus, non-landowners, too, were significantly
affected by the district's policies. 7 0
The Foster court noted that the statute in question
enfranchised landowners who used their land for agricultural
or horticutural purposes, but not landowners who used their
land for other purposes. The issue before the court was: "Can
the [irrigation] district constitutionally accord greater weight
to votes cast by some members of the class directly affected by
district operations than it does to other members of this
class?"'' The Foster court concluded that such a voting proce-
167. 102 Wash. 2d 395, 687 P.2d 841 (1984).
168. Id. at 404, 687 P.2d at 846.
169. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (electing power district's directors limited
to landowners and voting power apportioned to number of acres owned); Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (limiting eligible
voters to landowners does not violate the notion that every person's vote is equal when
the activity being voted on falls disproportionately on the landowners).
170. Foster v. Irrigation Dist., 102 Wash. 2d at 409-410, 687 P.2d at 849-50.
171. Id. at 410-11, 687 P.2d at 850.
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dure violates article I, section 19 "because it does not account
for a class of persons significantly affected by the district's
operations. It gives them no voice." '172
Admittedly, residential tenants whose landlords forbid
them to post political signs are not disenfranchised and are not
in the same position as the non-landowners in Foster who
were denied the right to vote. Both landlords and their resi-
dential tenants are free to cast ballots in general elections. But
while residential tenants retain an electoral voice, their voice
is, of necessity, a quieter and more subdued one. In the
absence of a legal remedy against landlord suppression of ten-
ant election speech, tenants cannot participate in the pre-elec-
tion debate on equal terms with landlords and homeowners. 73
If courts were to uphold a landlord's right to censor or flatly
prohibit the political expression of his tenants, then only land-
owners would enjoy the freedom to publicly endorse the candi-
dates of their choice in their own residential neighborhood.
This result would violate both the spirit and the letter of arti-
cle I, section 19, because an election where one class of citizens
is inhibited from participating fully in the election debate
could hardly be deemed a "free and equal" election.
In Alderwood Associates, Justice Dolliver concurred in the
result reached by the plurality because, as he saw it, the "over-
riding public interest . . . is to make the initiative process
available to all.' 74 Of course, the shopping mall owners in
Alderwood had not and could not forbid the Washington Envi-
ronmental Council from seeking to place an initiative on the
state ballot. They could, however, impede and frustrate the
process by making it more difficult for the council to collect
the signatures that were necessary before the initiative could
qualify for the ballot. Similarly, residential landlords cannot
forbid their tenants from voting. But landlords can, unless for-
bidden by the courts, make it more difficult for their tenants to
promulgate political views, thus decreasing the chances of suc-
172. Md
173. Compare Seattle v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 663, 670-71, 673, 694 P.2d 641 (1985)
(although WASH. REV. CODE § 35.13.165 "does not directly limit the right to vote in
annexation elections to property owners. . .[it] gives property owners the power to
prevent an election by filing a petition." The Court held that the statute violated
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 19.).
174. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 252, 635 P.2d at 120 (Dolliver, J.,
concurring).
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cess for candidates and causes endorsed or supported by
tenants.
In First National Bank v. Bellotti the United States
Supreme Court extended to banks the first amendment right
to spend money in political campaigns. 175  There is no sound
reason why banks should have the freedom to advertise their
political preferences free from governmental restraint, while
residential tenants do not have the freedom to publish their
political views free from restrictions imposed by private land-
lords. Justice Dolliver observed that "[i]mplicit in the initia-
tive process is the need to gather signatures in a manner which
does not violate or unreasonably restrict the rights of private
property owners.' 1 76 The same principle is true for general
elections and political expression by residential tenants.
Implicit in the general election process is the need to fos-
ter political expression and debate in a manner that does not
violate or unreasonably restrict the rights of residential land-
lords. The integrity of the electoral system is at issue, regard-
less of whether votes are being cast in favor of candidates or
legislation. Without judicial protection against a landlord's cen-
sorship of tenants' political expression, elections will fail to be
truly "free and equal" as mandated by article I, section 19.
E. Counterarguments of the Landlords
The Alderwood balancing test weighs the speech interests
of tenants against the countervailing interests of landlords. In
their defense, landlords have offered various justifications for
their suppression of tenant speech. Most of the more common
justifications have already been rejected by the courts in other
cases involving free speech, and those remaining can be
refuted. Landlords may claim their censorship is justified by
the danger of misattribution, by the need to preserve the aes-
thetic appearance of the property, or by the desire to prevent
vandalism. Moreover, landlords may contend that the exis-
tence of alternative residences excuses them from permitting
speech activities on their premises. Each of these alleged justi-
fications should be rejected by the courts.
175. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
176. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 253, 635 P.2d at 121 (Dolliver, J.,
concurring).
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1. Fears of Misattribution
The misattribution rationale was first expressed in
Pruneyard v. Robins 77 in which the property owner claimed
that if he permitted others to use his mall for speech activities,
the public might mistakenly infer that the owner approved of,
or endorsed, the views being expressed. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that it was
unlikely that misattribution would occur.'78 It is even less
likely that a passerby would believe that political signs in the
apartment windows were expressing the views of the apart-
ment complex owner. Moreover, in Pruneyard the Court
observed that property owners could always "expressly disa-
vow any connection with the message by simply posting signs"
that "disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could
explain that the persons are communicating their own
messages by virtue of state law."' 79 In Alderwood Associates, a
plurality of the Washington Supreme Court expressly
approved the reasoning in Pruneyard.8 ° Because a landlord
can fully protect himself against misattribution by posting a
simple disclaimer, the danger of misattribution affords no
sound justification for the suppression of tenant speech.
2. Aesthetics and the Appearance of the Neighborhood
Another justification commonly advanced by landlords in
support of prohibitions against posting political signs on their
property is the goal of promoting the aesthetic appearance of
residential communities. Case law concerning government reg-
ulation of political signs provides guidance on how to respond
to this argument.
In Peltz v. City of South Euclid,'' the first major appellate
decision involving municipal regulation of political signs, the
Ohio Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a city
ordinance that completely prohibited erecting political signs on
both public and private property.182 The City of South Euclid
had attempted to justify the law as an anti-litter and anti-traf-
fic hazard measure.8 3 But the court rejected the aesthetic
177. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
178. Id. at 87.
179. Id,
180. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 245 n.9, 635 P.2d at 117.
181. 11 Ohio St. 2d 128, 228 N.E.2d 320 (1967).
182. Id. at 134, 228 N.E.2d at 324.
183. Id at 132-33, 228 N.E.2d at 323-24.
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defense of the ordinance as a litter prevention law because
such an aesthetic goal was insufficient to justify a complete
and total ban on policital signs. Instead, the court commented
that a municipality must limit itself to less restrictive measures
such as establishing sign setback requirements or imposing
fines against property owners who litter the public streets with
their signs.1 1 4 The court also rejected the public safety justifi-
cation offered by the city because political signs could not be
shown to be a greater traffic hazard than other types of land-
scape features that regularly attract the attention of
motorists.
185
In Ross v. Goshi,86 the island paradise County of Maui,
Hawaii enacted a similar ordinance. The Maui ordinance out-
lawed all outdoor political campaign signs except for those
signs that identified the headquarters of a political candidate.
Citing the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Peltz, the United
States District Court for Hawaii struck down the ordinance as
violative of the first amendment. 187 The court rejected argu-
ments concerning the need to preserve the natural beauty of
the country on the ground that there were less drastic means
available to achieve the governmental interest in promoting
aesthetics. 8 8
The town of Brookfield, Wisconsin enacted a municipal
ordinance which met a similar fate in Martin v. Wray.'89
Brookfield did not ban all political signs, but did prohibit the
display of campaign signs in residential areas. The district
court in Martin was not persuaded that the desire to maintain
an uncluttered appearance in residential neighborhoods could
justify a ban on political signs. 9 ° In Baldwin v. Redwood
City, '9 the Ninth Circuit struck down a similar ban on polit-
ical signs in residential neighborhoods.
In 1981, the issue of municipal regulation of signs reached
the United States Supreme Court in Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego.' San Diego had enacted an ordinance which prohib-
184. Id.
185. Id at 133, 228 N.E.2d at 324.
186. 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Hawaii 1972).
187. Id at 953.
188. Id. at 954-55.
189. 473 F. Supp. 1131 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
190. Id. at 1138.
191. 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1970).
192. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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ited all billboards that carried noncommercial messages. The
Supreme Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional
on its face.' 93 Although the Court recognized that San Diego
had a valid interest in the "advancement of the city's aesthetic
interests," such an interest was not sufficient to justify the
complete ban on noncommercial billboard speech.'94 Recogniz-
ing that commercial speech was entitled to less first amend-
ment protection than other forms of speech, the Court held
that commercial billboard speech could be prohibited by local
ordinance.
195
Applying Metromedia to landlord-tenant disputes over the
posting of signs, it is reasonable to conclude that a city could
prohibit a residential tenant from posting commercial messages
such as advertisements for babysitting or lawn mowing serv-
ices, but could not prohibit a residential tenant from posting
signs declaring his political views on upcoming elections.
Three years after Metromedia, however, in City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent,196 the Supreme Court distinguished
Metromedia and upheld a Los Angeles municipal ordinance
that prohibited posting signs on public property. Unlike the
ordinance in Metromedia, the Los Angeles ordinance was held
"content neutral" because it did not differentiate between com-
mercial and political speech.197 Moreover, the Los Angeles law
did not prohibit the posting of signs on private property.
198
Instead, the prohibition was carefully limited to public prop-
erty.199 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted that "by
not extending the ban to all locations, a significant opportunity
to communicate by means of temporary signs is preserved.
200
The dissenters in Vincent argued that there was an insufficient
showing that "a significant number of private parties would
allow the posting of signs on their property," and suggested
that "common sense suggests the contrary at least in some
instances."
'20 1
The majority in Vincent concluded that "[t]he problem
193. Id. at 521.
194. Id at 510.
195. Id. at 520.
196. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
197. Id at 794.
198. Id. at 795.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 809.
201. Id. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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addressed by this ordinance-the visual assault on the citizens
of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted
on public property-constitutes a significant substantive evil
within the City's power to prohibit."2 °2 The majority held that
posted political signs, like billboards "wherever located and
however constructed, can be perceived as an 'aesthetic
harm.' ")203
The dissenters feared, however, "that aesthetic interests
are easy for a city to assert and difficult for a court to evalu-
ate." The difficulties arise from "the unavoidable subjectivity
of aesthetic judgments-the fact that 'beauty is in the eye of
the beholder.' ",204 Justice Brennan adhered to his view,
expressed earlier in the Metromedia case, that "'before defer-
ring to a city's judgment, a court must be convinced that the
city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic con-
cerns with respect to its environment.' "205
By recognizing the importance of aesthetic interests, the
decision in Vincent lends support to the arguments of land-
lords in the context of private disputes between landlord and
tenants. But it is difficult to apply Vincent to the landlord-ten-
ant situation for two reasons. First, it is difficult to gauge the
adequacy of alternative methods of communication. The Vin-
cent Court upheld a ban on posting signs on public property,
with the understanding that private property sites would
remain available. A landlord prohibition against tenant signs
effectively eliminates the one private property site available to
the tenant. 6
Second, the ordinance in Vincent did not foreclose posting
political signs on property which the proponent had a property
interest. On the contrary, the City of Los Angeles simply for-
bade using property which belonged exclusively to the City of
Los Angeles. But in the landlord-tenant situation, the con-
202. Id. at 807.
203. Id at 808 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. at 10).
204. 466 U.S. at 821-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. The First Circuit has distinguished Vincent on precisely these grounds.
Matthews v. Needham, 764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985). The Needham court struck down a
town bylaw that barred posting of political signs on residential property but permitted
posting of commercial ones. Vincent was distinguishable because (1) that law
prohibited posting of signs, regardless of content, and (2) the Vincent ordinance
limited signs on public property, while the Needham bylaw touched private property.
Private property, by its very nature, "may justify a greater degree of first amendment
protection." Needham, at 61.
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tested site "belongs" to both the landlord and the tenant
because both have concurrent property interests in the same
property.
While a partial ban on posting signs on public property
survived constitutional attack in Vincent, total bans on posting
signs on any property were invalidated in Peltz and Ross; and
partial bans outlawing signs in residential districts were struck
down in Martin and Baldwin. A landlord's prohibition on a
tenant's right to post political signs in an apartment window
seems most analogous to the residential neighborhood bans
struck down in Martin and Baldwin.
If, under the first amendment, local governments cannot
constitutionally prohibit posting political signs in residential
neighborhoods, why should landlords be permitted to accom-
plish the same result by forbidding their tenants to post such
signs? If the former practice violates the first amendment,
then the latter practice should violate article I, section 5 of the
Washington Constitution. Because state action is not always
required to bring conduct under the protective shield of the
state constitutional free speech provision,20 7 it would be para-
doxical and unacceptable to permit private landlords to impose
a regime of political censorship on their tenants when such
censorship powers are denied to governmental actors.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that some cities have
implicitly recognized that the speech rights of the tenant are
superior to the speech rights of the landlord. A Seattle Munic-
ipal Ordinance, for example, provides that: "No person shall
place a temporary political sign on private property without
the consent of the rightful occupier of such property. ' 20 ' The
word "occupier" manifests a legislative determination that it is
the occupant of the premises who has the paramount right to
decide whether or not to display political signs. The occupant
has the ultimate right to make the aesthetic determination of
whether the neighborhood's appearance is harmed, enhanced,
or unaffected by the posting of political signs. This right exists
regardless of whether the occupant is the owner or a tenant.
The appearance of a residential neighborhood that is posted
with political messages may seem tarnished when viewed by a
207. For an alternative view that the Washington Supreme Court is more
ambivalent in its approach to the "State Action" requirement, see Skover, supra note
127, at 244.
208. Seattle Mun. Ordinance § 2.24.050(B) (1985).
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naturalist, landscape artist, or environmentalist. But the
appearance of a vigorous and healthy participatory democracy,
as expressed through the signs, is to some a cause for happi-
ness. In the end, the tenant's concept of beauty should prevail
on this issue.
3. The Potential for Vandalism
Political views can be controversial and unpopular views
can spark a violent response. For that reason, landlords may
attempt to justify a ban on political signs by arguing that polit-
ical speech would or might lead to acts of vandalism that
would damage the landlord's property. But it was settled long
ago that speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute
[or] brings about a condition of unrest," is constitutionally pro-
tected so long as it does not involve "fighting words" or the
immediate incitement of unlawful acts.2" 9 Speakers do not lose
their free speech rights simply because their listeners may
react in a hostile manner. If they did, vandals and rioters
could effectively censor the views of anyone with whom they
disagreed.21 °
The vandalism argument, advanced by landlords seeking
to suppress tenant speech, may be factually accurate in some
cases. Signs endorsing an unpopular candidate or cause may
very well trigger a responsive act of vandalism resulting in
damage to the property of the landlord. But the vandalism
argument cannot prevail. As a variant of the "heckler's veto"
theory, the "vandals' veto" theory must be rejected because its
acceptance would constitute the beginnings of a form of fas-
cism enforced by private parties instead of by the state. If the
"vandals' veto" is sanctioned, then a violent and destructive
minority could deny freedom of expression to the majority and
an aroused majority could deny freedom of expression to a
minority. Violence and destruction cannot become the cur-
rency which controls the marketplace of ideas.
209. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (petitioner addressed an
audience inside an auditorium outside of which was an angry crowd protesting the
meeting).
210. See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (Supreme Court reversed the
convictions of peaceful civil rights demonstrators who were arrested because of
bystanders unruly conduct).
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4. Alternative Residential Forums
A landlord who wishes to suppress tenant speech may con-
tend that if his tenants wish to express their political views on
their residential premises, then they should move to a home or
apartment where the landlord does not object to such speech
activity. This approach was implicitly rejected in Alderwood
Associates by a plurality of the Washington Supreme Court.
The initiative signature collectors in Alderwood could have
moved to a different shopping center. Nevertheless the court
held that the Alderwood plaintiffs were entitled to exercise
their article I, section 5 rights at that particular shopping mall.
Obviously, moving to a different shopping mall for an after-
noon of leafletting is easier than moving to a different apart-
ment when a general election approaches. Therefore, the
existence of an alternative residential forum for electoral
speech is not relevant to the Alderwood balancing approach. If
it were relevant, the right to freedom of speech could be exer-
cised only by those residential tenants who were willing to pay
the price of relocating.
F. Property Rights Basis for Tenant's Right
to Free Expression
Even if a state court refused to recognize an affirmative
state constitutional right to individual freedom of speech that
is protected against private abridgment,211 the court cannot
thereby rid itself of the conflict between the speech and prop-
erty rights at issue. In landlord-tenant speech disputes, both
parties have constitutionally recognized property rights.212 In
these disputes, since the property is jointly held by the land-
lord and tenant, the court must answer the question of which
party has the paramount right of expression under property
law.
The simple answer to this question is the universally rec-
211. See, e.g., State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. at 178, 273 S.E.2d at 712 ("This court could
... interpret our State Constitution to protect conduct similar to that of defendant ....
However, we are not disposed.").
212. The leasehold interest of a tenant has been recognized as a compensable
property right under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution. See A.W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924) (tenant was
entitled to compensation for property taken by President for war purposes even
though tenant not owner of property); Alamo Land and Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S.
295 (1976) (holder of a leasehold interest is entitled to just compensation for the value
of that interest when it is taken upon condemnation by the United States).
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ognized principle that the tenant's leasehold interest consti-
tutes the broadest possible grant of uses.213 Thus, in the
absence of complicating factors,214 the presumption must be
that the tenant's possessory interest includes the use of the
property for speech purposes.
In Washington, the courts have long held that "during the
existence of the lease a lessee is for all general purposes the
owner of the demised premises." '215 The sole limitations
implied by common law are that the uses may not be unlawful
and they may not constitute waste.21 6 Washington courts have
found that only those uses which constitute nuisances are
unlawful.21 7 Waste is defined as the commission of an injury to
the reversion by the person holding the possessory interest.218
It is inconceivable that a Washington court would hold
that posting a political sign in the areas subject to the tenant's
exclusive possessory interest constitutes an unlawful use.
Since article I, section 5 guarantees that "every person may
freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects," the use of
property for speech purposes, far from being unlawful, is a pro-
tected use under the state constitution.
Regarding waste, Washington courts have looked for uses
of the property that resulted in serious and permanent damage
to the premises.219 The exercise of freedom of expression does
not cause serious and permanent damage to the property.
There is little, if any, tangible injury done to property by the
posting of a political campaign sign. A yard sign disturbs, at
most, a few square inches of lawn; a window sign or door sign
involves, at most, a small number of tape marks. In any event,
these injuries can be easily remedied prior to the expiration of
the lease. Other less tangible injuries, such as visual clutter,
are transitory and unlikely to result in serious or permanent
213. 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 326, at 848 (1968) ("A lessee is entitled to use
the premises for any lawful or valid purpose .... ")
214. For a discussion of the primary complicating factor, a written lease
restriction, see supra notes 238-250 and accompanying text.
215. Noon v. Mironski, 58 Wash. 453, 455, 108 P. 1069, 1070 (1910) (quoting 18 AM.
& ENG. ENCY. LAW 2d, at 634) (date unknown).
216. Noon, at 455, 108 P. at 1070.
217. Ridpath v. Spokane Stamp Works, 48 Wash. 320, 93 P. 416 (1908) (jury
question as to whether operation of machinery by lessee of ground floor of building
constituted a nuisance when other floors of building used as hotel).
218. Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Washington, 49 WASH.
L. REV. 291, 335 (1974).
219. Id. (citing as examples: tearing out floor, removing oven from foundry).
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damage. Although the landlord might claim transitory damage
to the market value of the property because of sign posting,
the signs are still temporary in nature, and the apartment may
be returned to its original state at the termination of the ten-
ancy. This is all that the landlord is entitled to under his
residual property rights in the apartment.
Moreover, the minimal "injury" caused to the property by
the political sign posting is justifiable when weighed against
the exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom
of expression. A use imbued with a constitutional right cannot
be termed "unnecessarily injurious" to the property. The con-
sumption of resources in the exercise of a constitutional right
does not equate with unnecessary waste of the premises.
G. Privacy Rights Basis for Tenant's Right
to Free Expression
In the context of article I, section 7 and fourth amendment
privacy rights, Washington courts have recognized that it is the
tenant, not the landlord, who holds the preeminent right to
freedom from unreasonable searches. In the recent case of
State v. Mathe,22 ° the Washington Supreme Court held that a
landlord was unable to give valid consent to a police search of
the residential tenant's home. The court held that the consti-
tutional right to privacy belonged to the occupant, not to the
owner of the premises. Similarly, the Washington Court of
Appeals has held that a hotel guest who rents a room has a
right to privacy in his room which cannot be superseded by a
consent to search that is given to the police by the hotel
proprietor.22 '
Just as the superior privacy right to privacy is vested in
the residential tenant, not in the landlord, so too the superior
free speech right should be vested in the tenant and not in the
landlord. This conclusion may be reached without any
recourse to constitutional analysis. Putting aside article I, sec-
tion 5, the issue may be resolved solely within the context of
property law. The tenant has a property right to decide what
use to make of the property during the term of the lease. This
right insures that the tenant is free to use the property for any
lawful purpose, whether it be planting corn or planting polit-
ical yard signs.
220. 102 Wash. 2d 537, 688 P.2d 859 (1984).
221. State v. York, 11 Wash. App. 137, 521 P.2d 950 (1974).
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While the tenant's right is clearly superior to the land-
lord's right in those areas where the tenant has exclusive pos-
session (e.g., the interior and exterior walls of the
apartment),222 the issue becomes more complicated if the ten-
ant seeks to post a political sign in the common areas of the
leased premises. Again, both the landlord and tenant have rec-
ognized property rights in these areas.223 Although the land-
lord has the right to regulate the use of common areas, he may
not do so in a manner which completely denies the tenant a
lawful use of the area.224 Neither may the landlord make use
of the common areas in a manner which prevents a reasonable
use of those areas.2
25
One scholar has described the tenant's ancillary right to
the use of common areas in these terms:
Suppose the ordinary situation in which a tenant leases an
apartment ... in a larger building. Obviously, he must have
the use of certain portions of the premises that are under
the landlord's general possession, such as hallways, stair-
ways, elevators, and walkways, though the parties likely will
not make specific provision for this use in their lease. It is
unthinkable that the law would not protect the tenant's use
of these parts of the landlord's premises and perhaps other
uses that are necessary to the expected use and possession of
the leased premises. To the extent he is thus protected, the
tenant has a right, not merely a privilege, an easement or
servitude, not merely a license.226
Since the tenant has a qualified property right to the use
of the common areas, he is not restricted to posting his polit-
ical signs on the walls or windows of his apartment. Particu-
larly if his apartment is windowless on the sides facing public
streets, or if his apartment is the last one on an upper floor
corridor, the tenant may wish to post his sign in a more visible
222. The tenant "ordinarily has the exclusive right to use the outer walls of that
portion of the building so leased by him for the purposes of posting . . . notices
thereon." 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant § 329, at 853 (1968).
223. The tenant has an implied right of access in all common areas necessary for
enjoyment of the exclusively held premises. The landlord has the right to reasonably
regulate common areas; State v. Fox, 82 Wash. 2d 289, 510 P.2d 230 (1973); Konick v.
Champneys, 108 Wash. 35, 183 P. 75 (1919).
224. Fox, at 293, 510 P.2d at 233.
225. See Lindbloom v. Berkman, 43 Wash. 356, 86 P. 567 (1906) (Washington
Supreme Court disallowed landlord's leasing of common areas to nonresidents).
226. Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Washington, 49 WASH.
L. REV. 291, 333 (1974).
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common area. While he may impose reasonable regulations
upon such uses, the landlord may not completely deny the ten-
ant the use of the common area for this purpose. 2
In State v. Fox,228 the Washington Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of landlord control over common areas in
the context of a dispute where the tenant sought to exercise
his constitutional right to confer with counsel. In Fox, the
defendant, an attorney, drove through a gate that was clearly
marked with a "No Trespassing" sign in order to meet with his
clients who were migrant farm workers. The workers were
housed in buildings located on the farm owner's private prop-
erty. Before the attorney could reach his destination, he was
arrested for trespassing. On appeal, the Washington Supreme
Court reversed the trespass conviction and held that "Fox had
a lawful right to be there. '229 Moreover, the court held that
this right was derived from the first and fourteenth amend-
ments to the federal constitution. 230 Thus, the Fox court
impliedly held that a tenant's federal free speech rights cannot
be curtailed by the judicial enforcement of a landlord's desire
to prevent his tenants from communicating with others. This
is true even though the landlord purported only to prohibit the
attorney from entering the farm's common areas.
To determine what is a reasonable regulation of common
areas, it is again useful to look at analogous federal case law
dealing with permissible government regulation of political
signs. Generally speaking, municipalities have been unsuccess-
ful in imposing statutory time limits on the posting of political
signs to periods such as the sixty days before an election.231
Similarly, a landlord should not be able to limit his tenants'
freedom to post political signs at any time prior to an election.
227. See Konick v. Champneys, 108 Wash. 35, 41, 183 P. 75, 77 (1919) (landlord may
not deny access to common areas to a delivery person on the premises at the tenant's
request):
It is not, of course, intended to be said that the owner of an apartment
house may not make reasonable regulations governing the use of the entrance
ways to the building .... But the regulations must be reasonable, they must
not be so stringent as to amount to a practical denial of the right.
228. 82 Wash. 2d 289, 510 P.2d 230 (1973).
229. Id at 293, 510 P.2d at 233.
230. I&
231. Antioch v. Candidates Outdoor Graphic Service, 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (60 days before election restriction on political signs violates first amendment);
Orzio v. Town of North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. N.Y. 1977) (six weeks
before election held unconstitutional); Van v. Travel Information Council, 52 Or. App.
399, 628 P.2d 1217 (1981) (60 days before election restriction held invalid).
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On the other hand, where common areas are concerned, it
would appear reasonable for a landlord to require tenants to
remove election signs within a definite number of days after
the election. Once the ballots are cast, the message of a polit-
ical endorsement loses its power to influence the election
outcome.
Limitations on the size of signs posted in common areas
should be upheld as long as they are reasonable. The key cri-
terion for judging whether such a limitation is reasonable is to
determine how large the sign must be before the message is
clearly legible to the public and passersby. This will vary
depending upon the proximity of the premises to streets,
parks, and businesses.
The Ninth Circuit has upheld a municipal ordinance limit-
ing individual political signs to a maximum size of sixteen
square feet. However, the Ninth Circuit also struck down a
provision that no more than eighty square feet of signs could
be displayed on any one parcel of real estate. 32 One year later,
the same court struck down a municipal ordinance that limited
political signs in residential neighborhoods to a maximum area
of four square feet.233
In the context of private landlord regulation of common
areas, it appears these parameters would prove reasonable in
most cases. A tenant would seldom require a sign larger than
sixteen square feet in order to convey his message to other ten-
ants using the common areas. But a size limitation of four
square feet might effectively limit the tenant to rather short
political messages. While a candidate's last name generally
lends itself to a message of one or two words (e.g., "Elect
Brooks" or simply "Brooks"), other political messages may
require lengthier statements (e.g., "Oppose Apartheid, Support
Divestiture and Trade Restrictions Against South Africa").
When a landlord imposes unreasonable restrictions on a
tenant's speech use of a portion of the premises within the ten-
ant's exclusive possession, the tenant has a cause of action
against the landlord for disturbing his use of the premises.234
The cause of action vested in the tenant is one for breach of
232. Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976).
233. Verrilli v. City of Concord, 548 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1977).
234. Aldrich v. Olson, 12 Wash. App. 655, 531 P.2d 825 (1975) (tenant
counterclaimed against landlord for wrongful eviction); Conaway v. Time Oil Co., 34
Wash. 2d 884, 210 P.2d 1012 (1949) (a written painting agreement constituted a license,
not a lease; thus lessors had full possession of their land).
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the covenant of quiet enjoyment,2 35 a covenant implicit within
all residential lease agreements. 3 6 The remedies available to
the injured tenant include a judgment for damages, injunctive
relief, or both.23 7
Therefore, under conventional property law principles, a
tenant has a remedy for landlord interference with his right to
post political signs. This remedy exists regardless of whether
the tenant has a constitutional remedy for the same injury. In
Washington, and in other states that have accepted the Robins
and Alderwood Associates theory of state constitutional protec-
tion speech against private abridgment of free speech, a tenant
need not resort to property law in order to obtain relief from
the courts. But in those states where this constitutional theory
has been rejected, or where the theory has not yet been consid-
ered, a tenant may obtain virtually identical relief by raising
the same issues in an action for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATIONS OF
TENANT'S RIGHTS
Absent some overriding public policy interest, nothing pre-
vents a tenant from contractually giving up his speech rights,
whether constitutional or common law in nature. Common
law property rules also can be modified by the terms of a lease
so as to restrict the scope of the tenant's permissible uses of
the property.238 However, not all contractual modifications are
acceptable to the courts. A number of important public poli-
cies may make certain contractual provisions judicially unen-
forceable. A well-known example is a covenant not to sell
property to persons of a minority race, the landmark case
being Shelley v. Kraemer.2 3 9 On its face, Kraemer purports to
find state action present in the judicial enforcement of a
235. Alexis v. Pittinger, 119 Wash. 626, 206 P. 370 (1922) (party blasting for
landlord as independent contractor did not excuse landlord from disturbing tenant's
peaceable possession).
236. Cherburg v. Peoples Nat'l. Bank, 88 Wash. 2d 595, 564 P.2d 1137 (1977)
(landlord's refusal to repair unsafe outside wall constituted breach of implied covenant
of quiet enjoyment).
237. Income Properties Inv. Corp. v. Trefethen, 155 Wash. 493, 508-09, 284 P. 782,
787 (1930), aff'd sub nom. Trefethen v. Niels Hansen Mfg. Co., 155 Wash. 702, 284 P.
787 (1930).
238. Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant, 49 WASH. L. REV. 291, 337
(1974).
239. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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racially discriminatory private agreement. But a modern non-
constitutional interpretation of Kraemer simply recognizes that
some purely private contracts are unenforceable because they
are in conflict with important public policies such as opposition
to racial discrimination.
In the context of landlord-tenant speech disputes, three
important public policies weigh heavily against judicial
enforcement of lease provisions that purport to eliminate or
unreasonably restrict a tenant's right to make political state-
ments by posting signs on the property.
The first public policy, already expressed in the common
law of property, opposes restraints on the uses of property. In
construing a contractual limitation on the tenant's speech use
of the premises, "all doubt must be resolved against the restric-
tion and in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the prop-
erty. .. ."'0 Thus, a generally worded restriction against
posting signs should not be interpreted as preventing the ten-
ant from posting political election signs. Instead, a generally
worded prohibition should be construed as prohibiting signs of
a type incompatible with a residential neighborhood, such as
commercial signs, billboards, and neon signs. In the absence of
an express written agreement, the general policy against
restrictions on the use of property should cause courts to con-
strue general lease provisions as allowing political signs com-
patible with a residential neighborhood.
The second public policy that militates against judicial rec-
ognition of contractual limitations on tenant speech is the gen-
eral policy of free and uninhibited exchange of political
messages. Even if the tenant lives in a state where the courts
decline to construe constitutional free speech provision as pro-
tecting citizens against private abridgment, there remains a
general public policy that favors political debate. Neither a
constitutional nor a statutory right is required before a court
can refuse to honor a contractual provision on public policy
grounds. The Washington Supreme Court has held that a con-
tract provision may be declared void if the nature of the provi-
240. Mt. Baker Park Club v. Colcock, 45 Wash. 2d 467, 470, 275 P.2d 733, 735 (1954)
(restrictive covenant limiting use to residential purposes held not to bar construction
of garage); see also Noon v. Mironski, 58 Wash. 453, 455, 108 P. 1069, 1070 (1910)
(grocery business was legitimate use of property even though restriction in lease
provided that premises were to be used "for purposes of conducting a bakery").
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sion is "manifestly injurious to the public interest."24' The
court has declared various contract provisions void on the
grounds that the provisions were in conflict with public poli-
cies against usury,24 2 in favor of full compensation under insur-
ance contracts,243  and against private resolution of child
custody disputes. 244 The public policy in favor of freedom of
political expression is considerably more powerful than the
public policy against usury. Rather, it is on par with the public
policy against racial discrimination that the United States
Supreme Court relied on when it to refused judicial enforce-
ment of the racially restrictive property covenant in Shelley v.
Kraemer.
245
Moreover, a residential lease provision that conflicts with
a public policy, such as that in favor of freedom of speech,
should be even more vulnerable to judicial invalidation when it
appears the landlord used his superior bargaining position to
coerce his tenants into accepting the lease. A landlord should
not be allowed to impose a standard form lease agreement on
all of his tenants, and thereby to remove an entire community
from the arena of political debate. The Washington Court of
Appeals has held:
The law has recognized that there is often no true equality
of bargaining power in such [standard form] contracts and
has accommodated that reality in construing them .... The
characterization of a lease as an adhesion contract because
exacted by reason of a gross disparity of bargaining power is
to enable the court to protect the injured party from an
unconscionable contract provision.24 6
Washington courts should not hesitate to hold that the
public policy in favor of freedom of speech cannot be overcome
by a residential landlord who offers housing to tenants on a
241. Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 454, 298 P. 705, 707
(1931) (quoting 13 C.J. 366, at 427 (1917)).
242. Id.; Whitaker v. Spiegel Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 408, 623 P.2d 1147, (1981), modified,
95 Wash. 2d 661, 637 P.2d 235 (1981) (credit constitutes "forbearance" within meaning
of usury statute).
243. Grandview Inland Fruit Co. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 189 Wash. 590, 66
P.2d 827 (1937) (appellant sought insurance money for full value of policy by virtue of
the valued policy statutes Rem. Rev. Stat. § 7150, 7151 (1922)).
244. Campbell v. Campbell, 19 Wash. 2d 410, 143 P.2d 534 (1944) (decree of divorce
with respect to the custody of children).
245. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
246. Blakely v. Housing Authority, 8 Wash. App. 204, 212-13, 505 P.2d 151, 156
(1973) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1965)).
1986]
48 University of Puget Sound Law Review
take-it-or-leave-it basis, thus forcing tenants to forfeit their
right to participate in election debates by posting political
signs.
Finally, public policy in favor of political participation in a
democracy militates against judicial enforcement of such lease
provisions. Again, entirely aside from the issue of whether
landlord censorship violates a state constitutional provision
such as the article I, section 19 guarantee of "free and equal
elections," it is sound policy to encourage all members of the
public to participate in elections. This participation is not lim-
ited to the act of voting, but encompasses all political activity
designed to stimulate public debate on the issues and the
candidates.
This public policy is particularly compelling in the case of
residential tenants, because available census data indicates that
renters presently lag far behind homeowners in the realm of
political participation. Renters comprise 35.6 percent of the
housing units in the nation.247 But, statistics indicate that
homeowners are far more likely to be registered voters than
tenants.248 Also, homeowners are twice as likely to actually
cast a vote as are their tenant counterparts. 249 Finally, renters
are statistically poorer, and more likely to be minority mem-
bers than are homeowners.250 Thus it appears that if landlords
are permitted to enforce lease restrictions against political
signs, the population that is silenced will tend to comprise
those who are predominantly poor, black, and politically inac-
tive. It might be argued that because renters tend not to vote,
they are less interested in posting election signs. But it could
also be argued that if more renters were free to join the polit-
ical debate by posting campaign signs, then more renters would
be inclined to vote. Moreover, the minority of renters who do
vote might stimulate their fellow nonvoting tenants to change
their political ways.
In summary, sound public policies favoring freedom of
247. United States Bureau of the Census, 1980, Census of Housing, Vol. 1, Table
HC 80-1-Al and HC 80-1-B1.
248. 77.2% of all homeowners; 47.4% of all renters. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Current Population Reports, series P-20, No. 383 and earlier reports.
249. Id. (62.2 percent of homeowners compared to 31.9 percent of all renters.)
250. 67.4% of all whites own their own homes but only 44.4% of all blacks are
homeowners. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Housing, vol. 1, tables HC 80-
1-Al and HC 80-1-B1. The median income of a homeowner in 1980 was $19,800,
whereas the median income of a renter was $10,500. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Current Housing Reports, H-150-83, American Housing Survey.
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property use, freedom of speech, and political participation
militate against the enforceability of lease provisions that pur-
port to deny tenants the right to post political signs.
V. CONCLUSION
A tenant seeking to invalidate a landlord-imposed prohibi-
tion against posting political messages may advance a number
of legal claims that vindicate the right to freedom of political
expression. The tenant may claim that his common law lease-
hold interest gives him a property right to be weighed against
that of the landlord. Both the tenant's leasehold and landlord's
fee simple interest give rise to first amendment property-based
speech rights. In assessing whose first amendment property-
based speech right is superior, an examination of the common
law of leases strengthens the tenant's position: a lessee has the
right, during the life of the lease, to use the property for any
lawful purpose, so long as the tenant does not commit waste.
A tenant's common law property rights are, therefore, superior
to those of the landlord's. As a result, the tenant's right to
post political messages should prevail, unless the parties alter
the common law by creating a contractual right of the landlord
to veto or ban political expression.
Where there is such an express agreement, the tenant may
be fortunate enough to live in a jurisdiction where the state
constitution has been interpreted to provide protection against
the private abridgment of speech. If so, he may combine his
common law claim with a state constitutional claim. Where a
balancing approach to competing free speech claims has been
judicially approved, this will allow the tenant to strengthen his
constitutional claim by pointing out that he, as well as the
landlord, has a property right. Thus, the state constitutional
claims should prevail over a landlord's claim that the tenant
has contractually agreed to give the landlord censorship
authority. Further, any such contract would be void as con-
trary to the public policy favoring freedom of speech guaran-
teed by the state constitution.
Additionally, the tenant may be able to make state consti-
tutional claims based upon provisions guaranteeing "free and
equal elections." Even in states where no such state constitu-
tional provision exists, the general public policy in favor of vig-
orous political debate and citizen participation in elections will
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support the tenant's use of the property for the communication
of a political message.
In cases where there is no recognized state constitutional
protection, the tenant may challenge a contractual provision in
a lease on the ground that any direct suppression of political
speech violates public policy: few public policies are as compel-
ling as the policy in favor of citizen participation in elections.
Also, a general public policy exists against restraints on the use
of property. Both of these public policies are reflected in vari-
ous state constitutional provisions and in the common law.
In summary, the tenant in his case against landlord cen-
sorship, can use constitutional, common law, and public policy
arguments, that are based on both his free speech rights and
property rights. A neat analytical separation of these argu-
ments is impossible because all law, on some level, is an
expression of one view of sound public policy. Thus, the ten-
ant's right to freedom of political expression, upon close exam-
ination, provides an apt illustration of the law professor's
adage: The law is a seamless web.
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